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1 provides a first study on use of professional peer reviews by the EU to strengthen the 
European fight against terrorism. The first part outlines two theoretical approaches to assessing the 
outcome effectiveness of such peer reviews, namely compliance and learning. Peer reviews can 
serve both ends and have been increasingly touted as an effective tool to address transnational 
threats. The second part analyzes the evolution and impact of the EU's peer reviews on the fight 
against terrorism. Although the first peer review took several years to complete, it was regarded as a 
striking success that improved mutual trust and the coherence of the international fight against 
terrorism. It was therefore followed by a second peer review on consequence management in 
response to terrorist attacks. From a critical perspective, it is shown that the impact of these peer 
reviews could be doubted from both a compliance and learning perspective, as monitoring and 
flanking measures have remained too weak. The conclusions point to additional political or 
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Over the last decade the fight against international terrorism has been crucial to the European  
integration process in matters of internal security. At the same time, the impact of EU policy-
making on national security systems has been doubted (Bures 2011), while informal processes for 
transnational counterterrorism cooperation remain ill-understood (Den Boer, Hillebrand et al. 
2008). This paper, therefore, analyses one such 'soft' cooperation or governance process that has 
been stimulated by the EU, namely mutual peer reviews on the counterterrorism policies of EU 
member states. 
 
This empirical case needs to be situated in the burgeoning empirical literature on European security 
governance (Schröder 2011; Ehrhart and Kahl 2010). In other policy areas EU scholars have 
increasingly moved from macro-level analyses of multilevel governance to governance instruments, 
which allow for more precise links to policy outcomes (Kassim and Le Gales 2010). Such an 
approach is already reflected in a growing studies on the EU's external security governance and the 
use of conditionality (e.g. Menon and Sedelmeier 2010). Few exceptions aside (Balzacq, 2008), 
however, EU-internal security governance remains predominantly discussed  from  institutional, 
legal or sociological perspectives (Bigo 2006; Monar 2010).  
 
Due to this underdeveloped theoretical literature, the first part of this paper reviews two basic 
perspectives on the possible effect of soft governance processes in matters of transnational security. 
One approach emphasises the promotion compliance with existing standards. The other underlines 
the potential for flexible problem-solving and learning. Each approach depends on a number of 
supportive factors, so that effective soft governance instruments are not easy to design or cheap to 
implement. This provides a basic framework for analysing the impact of peer reviews, which have 
been used by a variety of international organisations and for various issue areas. 
 
The second main part traces the development of the EU's peer review processes in the fight against 
terrorism. Drawing on the example of the FATF and EU criminal justice cooperation, EU Justice 
and Home Affairs ministers called for such a review process in the aftermath of 9/11. Despite this 
initial momentum, however, the first review was slow to unfold and depended on the renewed 
shock of the Madrid and London terror attacks to impact national counterterrorism arrangements. 
Furthermore, the concluding set of recommendations was only superficially monitored. The second 
peer review on 'consequence management' of serious terrorist attacks placed a greater emphasis on 
learning and the exchange of best practices, but suffered from a lack of analytical capabilities at the 
EU level. In sum, the two peer reviews contributed to fostering trust among the member states and 
EU institutions, but did not lead to a significant convergence towards a common European model in 
the fight against terrorism. The conclusions outline further avenues for research and touch upon the 




2. Peer reviews in the wider context of security governance 
 
'Dark' networks of terrorism and organised crime require increased transnational and less formal 
forms of security cooperation (Raab and Milward 2003). Peer review conducted under the aegis of 
international organizations can support such flexible security cooperation, or security governance,  
3 
in various ways. On the one hand, they can spread common standards and cooperative practices in 
the absence of hierarchy - i.e. promote compliance. On the other hand, they should help to devise or 
adapt policy in light of new challenges and information - i.e. promote learning. These two stylised 
perspectives mirror the option space between vertical and horizontal forms of cooperation that 
underpin most analytical discussions of governance per se. To clarify, the following discussion first 
briefly elaborates on the two perspectives of learning and compliance in security governance, and 
then links them to peer reviews by international organizations (including the EU). This provides the 





Despite the global shock of 9/11, one cannot expect spontaneous cooperation or cross-national 
convergence in the fight against terrorism. Institutional path-dependency, different threat profiles 
and long-standing national security cultures have perpetuated divergent approaches in Europe     
(Meyer 2009; Nohrstedt and Hansen 2010; Epifanio 2011). Moreover, international 
counterterrorism cooperation faces significant collective action problems (Enders and Sandler 
2006). Individual states may provide safe haven to terrorist groups in order to be spared from 
attacks, or may invest in purely national defences in the hope that terrorists will strike elsewhere. 
Some countries may also simply lack the capacities and financial resources to avoid international 
'weakest link' effects. For instance, terrorists have recently planted bombs on planes in Yemen to hit 
the US.  
 
International organisations that are engaged in the fight against terrorism seek to limit these dangers 
and collective action problems by means of a mixture of soft governance instruments and hard law 
(Heupel 2008). For instance, the UN adopted a wide range of international conventions, which 
prohibit sponsoring or supporting terrorist groups. But since 9/11, the Security Council also took 
care of the 'soft' side of cooperation and promised technical assistance to vulnerable states, so that 
Al Qaeda would not exploit them as safe havens.   
 
While soft law and technical assistance programs typically rely on a shadow of hierarchy to achieve 
credibility (Heritier and Lehmkuhl 2008),  less soft governance arrangements should not generally 
be seen as a second-best solution to top-down enforcement. Managerial approaches to governance 
and  public policy highlight that a shared sense of ownership, local variation and investments in 
administrative capacities for implementation can be more productive than strict rules and costly 
enforcement mechanisms (Chayes and Chayes 1995; Tallberg 2003). 
 
Soft security governance offers further benefits. Even if one starts from the assumption that Europe 
is characterised by a 'post-Westphalian' system that is less concerned with national sovereignty 
(Sperling 2010), security cooperation generates other significant political and financial costs. 
National governments should retain flexibility and primary responsibility for making critical value 
choices (within commonly accepted boundaries), as encapsulated in the dilemmas of 'guns or butter' 
and 'security vs. liberty'. A cautious approach  is especially indicated in the case of transnational 
terrorist that can switch to alternative targets (Sandler and Enders 2006) or seek to provoke strong 
countermeasures in order to increase their popular support (Guelke 2006).  
In short, from a compliance perspective soft security governance instruments should address shared 
vulnerabilities and foster international trust in the face of weakest link effects or other collective 






Horizontal governance processes should also facilitate the exchange of new information and mutual 
learning, which essential in the face of high uncertainty (Duit and Galaz 2008).  This clearly applies 
to the case of transnational terrorist groups whose actions are difficult to predict or to deter. Given 
the impossibility to defend all targets against attacks, disasters and failures – e.g. when a bomb goes 
off – are to be expected, but should also lead to constructive learning and review processes 
(Birkland 2006).  
 
Yet learning remains a very elusive concept in political science, where it has been be applied to an 
extremely wide range of phenomena or levels of analyses (Dunlop and Radaelli 2010). In this 
context, learning is often seen as a search for institutional legitimacy rather than for effectiveness 
and efficiency (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Especially in security issues political institutions seek 
to demonstrate a high level of responsiveness and control, while it is difficult to ascertain the 
objective use of knowledge and expertise (Boswell 2008).  
 
This paper cannot develop an encompassing definition of learning, or neatly distinguish learning 
from other factors that can induce policy change (Roederer-Rynning and Daugbjerg 2010). Suffice 
here to review a few contextual conditions that influence learning processes in political settings. 
Generally speaking, groups of experts are more likely to accentuate problem-solving perspectives 
and epistemic knowledge claims if they meet regularly, are professionally fairly homogenous and 
operate under loose (or no) political oversight mechanisms (Zito and Schout 2009; Sabel and Zeitlin 
2010). Practitioners in the fight against terrorism similarly highlight the benefits of voluntary and 
informal meetings with a comparatively small number of participants (Deflem 2004).  
 
In highly simplified terms, the ideal would be 'reflexive' learning through a power-free and 'bottom-
up' approach where the better expert argument counts. In contrast, if topics or discussion forums 
have been defined from the 'top-down' by more political actors, one could expect legitimacy-
seeking forms of learning. In this case policy processes and outcomes may remain basically 
unchanged, but could be framed differently to respond to external demands (Dunlop and Radaelli 
2010).  
 
Yet one should not construct a false contrast between good expert and bad political learning. Expert 
discourses are also power-structures that can block out dissenting voices. Moreover, expert 
knowledge cannot generally be expected to impact on the EU's multi-layered political system. 
Already in the case of a single agency or institution, 'organizational learning' involves more than 
knowledge acquisition, but requires knowledge codification, dissemination and reliable 
implementation (Benner and Rotmann 2008). Similar concerns also apply to governance networks 
in the EU (Schout 2009). It may not be necessary to achieve standardized policy implementation in 
such networks, but it is all the more difficult to ensure the reliable dissemination of knowledge.  
 
In short, soft governance instruments for learning typically depend on a delicate balance between, 
on the one hand,  open-ended expert discussion that can counter tendencies for political and 
legitimacy-oriented learning, and, on the other hand, processes for ensuring the dissemination and 
implementation of new knowledge or practices across multi-layered administrations. While it may 
difficult to ascertain in how far knowledge claims can trump political considerations, this latter 
dimension can be more easily pinpointed in the form of training programs or codified forms of 
knowledge (e.g. handbooks).   
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2.3. Peer reviews in international organisations 
 
In the context of international organisations, peer reviews are usually understood as a tool for 
'multilateral surveillance' (Schäfer 2006) of national policy – i.e. as governance instruments of 
compliance. Depending on the degree of international interdependence and centrality of the peer 
review process in a given issue area, they can incorporate a mixture of harder and softer monitoring 
and control instruments (de Ruiter 2008). For instance, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) set 
global standards in fight against money laundering that have been enforced through self-reporting 
as well as external assessments that can lead to coercive measures, such as blacklisting. Post 9/11, 
the FATF has also increasingly used positive incentives and administrative or 'technical assistance' 
(Romaniuk 2010, 320), which reflects the managerial approach to compliance touched upon above.  
 
Peer review processes have also been used by international organizations to develop new standards 
and policy approaches – i.e. as instruments for learning. The OCED has made particularly extensive 
use of peer reviews to assess and improve economic and educational policy from such a perspective 
(Mahon and McBride 2009). Similar mechanisms have taken hold in EU policy-making under the 
label of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). For instance, EU research policy that falls under 
this policy method include so-called peer-learning clusters (De Ruiter 2010). While it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to survey the extensive debate on the OMC (Krueger 2009), its (limited) 
outcome effectiveness depends among other factors - on an interplay between explorative agenda-
setting, bureaucratization and dissemination across the EU's administrative levels (Tholoniat 2010). 
 
Due to this ambiguous use of peer reviews by international organizations, the impact of EU peer 
reviews should also be explored from both a compliance and learning perspective. In light of the 
foregoing overview on different possible effects of soft governance instruments, this raises 
analytical questions, such as the following.  
 
Compliance:  How stringent are reporting and sanctioning mechanisms of the peer review process? 
How large is the leeway for national implementation? Are the flanking efforts, such as 
administrative capacity building, to support national implementation? 
 
Learning: Are peer review conducted under close political oversight or are discussions driven by 
technical experts? How is knowledge codified and disseminated? Are there dedicated training or 
knowledge-management programs? 
 
To be clear, these questions should not be confused with falsifiable hypotheses that can be tested on 
the basis of quantitative data or related qualitative methods (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). As 
will also be touched on below, the early stage of empirical research into peer review in EU security 
(and counterterrorism) cooperation requires a more inductive approach, which draws on different 










3. Peer reviews in European counterterrorism policy 
 
Against this background, the following part argues that the first EU peer review on the fight against 
terrorism depended on the external pressures of Eastern enlargements and the terrorist attacks of 
Madrid and London to reach a coherent form and politically successful outcome, which was 
formally defined as compliance with a standardized set of recommendations. The second peer 
review focused on a more delineated policy area, i.e. consequence management of terrorist attacks, 
and emphasized learning dynamics. Yet despite a growing procedural routine, the second review 
had a weak stand-alone impact and generated no significant new knowledge. The section concludes 
by a brief discussion of further applications of the peer review instrument in the EU's 
neighbourhood and the new policy issue of cyber-security. 
 
 
3.1. Peer reviews in the nascent Area of Freedom Security and Justice 
 
EU peer reviews in matters of internal security emerged in the late 1990s under the overarching 
treaty objective to create the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (ASFJ). The first EU Action 
Plan on Combating Organised Crime proposed that a  “mechanism should be established, based on 
the experience with the model developed in the FATF, to mutually evaluate the application and 
implementation at national level of the European Union and other international instruments and 
undertakings in criminal matters “(Council 1997). This reference to the FATF effectively meant that 
the effectiveness and efficiency of peer review instrument was taken for granted, and that new ASFJ 
could be fleshed out on the basis of already existing and widely accepted international standards.  
 
Two years later, interim results of the first round of evaluations on criminal justice cooperation were 
discussed in the Council Multidisciplinary Group on Organised Crime (MDG) (Council 1999).  The 
report formally stuck to the FATF approach, namely to monitor the implementation of existing 
recommendations and agreements. However, a closer reading reveals important differences that 
emphasised a softer approach. Evaluated member states could define the visit programme of the 
evaluators and request amendments to their reports. Moreover, reports and recommendations would 
only discussed within the confines of the MDG, which is composed of high-level experts from 
member states that can build on common professional norms and normally do not operate under 
tight political control. This barred confrontational naming and shaming by an external bureaucracy 
or secretariat as in the FATF. Instead, the EU Council Secretariat could only begin to build up in-
house expertise through assisting intergovernmental negotiations on the ASFJ.  
 
The concluding report to the first peer review in early 2001 underlined the cooperative spirit of the 
peer review process and the wider learning opportunities for all member states (Council 2001a). 
'Lessons' and 'best practices' should be collected in the so-called European Judicial Network, which 
could help to disseminate and implement new knowledge among independent professionals. In 
short, the first peer review maintained some formal appearances of the FATF compliance model, but 
mostly promoted learning processes as outlined above. Due to the relatively high degree of 
independence of participating experts, the MDG highlighted the constructive spirit of the review 





3.2. The emergence of the first review on counterterrorism   
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A few months later, 9/11 drastically changed the rhythm of EU internal security cooperation. The 
first critical JHA Council meeting of 21 September tabled a plethora of measures that had already 
been envisaged for the further construction of the ASFJ (den Boer and Monar 2002). It hardly 
attracted attention that the Council also called for an extension of peer reviews to 'national 
counterterrorism arrangements', which should now be conducted in an 'easier and swifter form' 
(Council 2001b). A few weeks later, this is precisely what happened in the case of the FATF that 
extended its recommendations and monitoring on money laundering to the fight against terrorism 
(Gardner 2007).  
 
Yet the EU peer review process could not be so easily set to a new purpose. At the time, only a 
minority of EU member states had specific counterterrorist legislation and associated institutional 
processes, so that the scope of evaluations was unclear.The sensitivity of the issue area raised 
further questions. For instance, it could not be taken for granted that national intelligence services 
would become subject to an external EU evaluation, even if only an informal and intergovernmental 
one. Thus, it took nearly a year for the EU Council Secretariat to send out a first standardised 
questionnaire to survey existing national counterterrorism provisions. While this followed the 
standard FATF peer review practice at the beginning of a review process, the lack of common 
knowledge base in this issue area was striking, since the Terrorism Working Group, based at the EU 
Council of Ministers, had been in existence since the early 1980s. So despite regular and long-
standing information exchanges on specific terrorist incidents and countermeasures and the dense 
institutional interaction in the EU, member states had no systemic or structural understanding of 
each other's level of defenses.  
  
A new legal basis for the peer review had to resolve further questions, such as the scope for national 
visits or the inclusion of the Commission (Council 2002). So instead of completing a simplified' 
review by the end of 2002 as originally intended in the aftermath of 9/11, a more complex and 
politically sensitive process was barely put together by then. By early 2003 the analysis of the first 
questionnaire (Council 2003a) underlined how difficult it would be to proceed with a coherent and 
meaningful review process. One the one hand, the questionnaire provided a perceptive summary of 
legislative, institutional and operational arrangements in different member states, which had 
hitherto been lacking. On the other hand, this systemic perspective across the EU underlined the 
persistent differences between those member states that had experienced terrorism prior to 9/11 and 
those that had not. Moreover, these differences were not only a matter of intensity or degree on a 
scale of commonly accepted set of counterterrorism policies or instruments, but reflected varying 
approaches to state-society relations or division of competences within each member state.  
 
To reduce complexity, EU interior ministers agreed to narrow the scope of the peer review to the 
use and exchange of information by both police and intelligence services. This could be seen as a 
very reasonable choice, as information exchange is critical to international counterterrorism 
cooperation.  Moreover, the inclusion of security actors beyond the police made inherent sense and 
went far beyond formal EU competences, so that the informal and intergovernmental peer review 
could   develop strong complementarities to EU security legislation. Yet precisely for this reason the 
peer review essentially had to start from scratch again. The Council Secretariat resorted to a second 
very extensive questionnaire while simultaneously asking the member states to catch up on the 
delayed review process (Council 2003b).  
 
This critical reliance on self-reporting accentuated the gap between inexperienced and experienced 
states in the fight against terrorism.  The latter could present their existing structures and processes  
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as effective or efficient to EU institutions that had never worked before on these issues, whereas the 
former could only promise to continue to build up their counterterrorism machinery after 9/11. It 
was not evident how meaningful quality or 'best practice' criteria that went beyond the simple 
recommendation to collect and exchange more information could emerge. In short, the first steps of 
the peer review simply consisted of a top-down and formalized information-gathering and reporting 
process. This improved the knowledge base of EU institutions and the Terrorism Working Group in 
Brussels, but was not designed to lead to changes or learning at the national level. At best, the peer 
review supported the establishment of a counterterrorism 'frame' – i.e. a legitimacy-seeking form of 
learning to demonstrate external commitment – in relation to a wide variety of security 
arrangements that had been very unevenly affected by the events of 11 September.  
 
The next step of the process, i.e. mutual on-site evaluations, should address these deficits. Mixed 
peer evaluation teams of two national experts, and one representative each from the Commission, 
Council Secretariat and Europol should visit each country for two to four days to prepare a detailed 
evaluation report. However, from mid-2003 onwards the concern with terrorism had already 
declined substantially among many member states, as evidenced by the growing implementation 
gap of EU's official Action Plan on Combating Terrorism. This declining interest also reflected in 
the peer review. Visits were scheduled to take place over more than a year, while the Terrorism 
Working Party did not invest more time to oversee the coherence and consistency of the results. As 
a result, the first national evaluation reports were very different in terms of sheer size and content, 
which mostly reflected the original response to the questionnaires.
2 
 
The Madrid terrorist bombing in March 2004 were therefore critical for pushing the first peer 
review beyond a general stock-taking exercise with little common analysis or standards. Shocked 
by the scale of the attacks the European Council underlined the direct connections between national 
and EU-wide security and urged member states to implement the existing counterterrorism agenda 
since 9/11. The new EU Counterterrorism Coordinator (supported by the Council Secretariat) 
rushed to present preliminary findings of the peer review, which spoke of the unresolved status or 
political objectives of the review. The report argued against a "one size fits all" approach, but also 
stressed that the EU should “stimulate” member states to cooperate better (Council 2004, 3).  
 
The EU's Eastern Enlargement in early 2004 added to the political pressure to come up with a more 
coherent and credible approach. While the new member states had to reform their police and 
judicial system and step up border security before accession, the fight against terrorism had mostly 
been raised in diplomatic declarations (stressing international solidarity or support for the US). 
Given that none of the new member states had significant experience with terrorism within its 
borders, such declarations could not be taken as a reliable indicator for national security measures. 
To address this possible gap in European defenses, the Terrorism Working Party promised an 
accelerated review of all new member states (plus the accession countries of Romania and Bulgaria) 
and began to set out a number of general recommendations that should be respected by all member 
states. 
 
By summer 2005 another serious terrorist attack in London underlined the salience of the threat. In 
this context, the peer review continued to attract political interest and concluded on a set of 
structured recommendations. These were furthermore structured into 1) 'core recommendations' that 
concerned operational coordination, management and sharing of information; 2) 'other significant 
recommendations' that related to the legal bases and use of intelligence, communication system and 
                                                 
2  Interview with national official, February 2011.  
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consequence management; and recommendations 'for action at EU level' to improve cooperation 
with bodies, such as Europol or the Situation Centre (Council 2005a). On paper, this coherent set of 
recommendations provided a concise yet flexible formulation how national and European structures 




3.3. Exploring impact of the first review 
 
From a political perspective, the formal endorsement of these recommendations by the Council of 
Ministers (2005b) clearly shifted the peer review to a compliance model. Each member state would 
present its response to the national evaluation report to the TWG, while the Counterterrorism 
Coordinator drew up a 'scoreboard' to tracing the implementation record of all recommendations 
across all member state.
4 By 2007 the follow-up reporting underlined the 'positive attitude' that 
prevailed during the peer review, and claimed that the processes contributed to more coherent and 
effective counterterrorism arrangements across Europe (Council 2007a). Although some 
recommendations were declared 'not relevant' by a number of member states, the scoreboard 
instrument indicated a near perfect implementation record of 95%.  
 
Unfortunately, for this paper is was not possible to get access to a representative set of national 
officials from different EU member states who participated in the peer review.
5 Still, a few 
interviewed experts partially confirmed this positive assessment. In particular, a senior and 
experienced representative from a new member state explained that the review report helped to 
promote a number of difficult dossiers at the national level, notably with regard to the creation of 
common data bases on terrorist suspects and provisions for retention of telecommunication data.
6 
Four experts from large member states similarly regarded the review in congruence with national 
reforms to improve information-sharing and coordination mechanisms, but would not impute a 
direct causality to the EU peer review.
7  
 
A recent independent survey on the creation 'fusion centres' or related coordination structures, 
which aim to integrate different data sources on terrorist threats, provides further evidence of a 
related convergence of national counterterrorism arrangements in Europe (Comite 2010). To be 
precise, peer review did not explicitly call for the creation of such centres, but recommended the 
flexible and streamlined use of threat assessments, intelligence and police information as is 
practiced in fusion centres. 
 
Yet this should not be taken as direct evidence of the impact or significance of the peer review. 
Studies on policy convergence and diffusion face profound methodological and argumentative 
challenges with regard to multiple and overlapping causality (Holzinger, Jörgens et al. 2007). In 
addition, the historical survey of this paper cannot be squared with a research design that would 
systematically separate the influence the peer review from other external event or variables. Future 
studies could focus on an individual recommendation of the peer review, namely facilitate the use 
                                                 
3  The content of the recommendations is discussed from a more critical angle below 
4  Such scoreboards had already been widely used with regard to key legislative measures of the EU's counterterrorism 
agenda, such as the European Arrest Warrant. 
5  Many member states would not publish the name of relevant experts in their national representations in Brussels or 
national ministries. Personal inquiries through the EU Terrorism Working Groups led to the identification of 
approximately eleven experts of which five were willing to be interviewed off-the-record. 
6  Interview, March 2011 
7  Interviews, February 2011  
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of special investigative techniques and the use of intelligence in court, and trace its diffusion 
through the EU and other international organisations on the member states.
8 Empirical data may 
also be improved by identifying additional national experts who participated in EU peer reviews, or 
by obtaining further declassifications of national review reports.
9 New data and alternative research 
designs may then lead to more precise assessments of the impact of peer reviews, or the influence 
of the EU on national counterterrorism policy.  
 
What already emerges at this stage is that the formal implementation record of the first EU peer 
review needs to be questioned. The overall figure of a 95% success or implementation rate is not 
credible. This is mostly clearly the case with regard to the last set of recommendations that focuses 
on the cooperation between member states and European bodies, where one can draw on alternative 
sources for information and one can exclude an overlap of purely domestic reform discussions. For 
instance, a later peer evaluation on the exchange of criminal intelligence between member states 
and Europol that was conducted under the aegis of the MDG highlighted serious and persistent 
difficulties (Council 2007b). Given that information on terrorist cases is even more difficult to 
handle, one can take this as evidence for the superficial reporting of the scoreboard. Similarly, the 
recommendation to cooperate with the Police Chief Task Force had little practical relevance as this 
body was dissolved due to its widely acknowledged ineffectiveness after the ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty. Last but not least, even the former director of the EU's Situation Centre admits that 
the EU remains be cut off from most sensitive intelligence (Shapcott 2011). 
 
Various recommendations of the peer review that were directed at the national level also lack 
credibility. Generally speaking, member states' inputs to the Council Secretariat scoreboard could 
not be cross-checked by further on-site visits. This invited over-optimistic reporting and framing 
effects in order not to be singled out as a laggard. And while a high level of flexibility is essential 
for exploiting the advantages of soft governance instruments, various recommendations were 
simply too hazy to be meaningful. For instance, recommendation eight stated that all national police 
forces should be 'fully engaged in the fight against terrorism and receive appropriate training'.  In 
absence of any further specification of such an engagement or training, almost any arrangement 
could be presented as compliant. And even if one assume good faith, a managerial perspective on 
compliance would highlight that comparatively weak states would require external assistance to 
meet new demanding benchmarks. No related programme, such as the exchange of liaison officers 




3.4. The second peer review 
 
The following second peer review reflected the ambiguous outcomes of the first round. The review 
process itself was regarded as a model that should be continued, but without a clear sense whether 
learning or compliance aspects should stand at the forefront. Common standards had formally been 
put into place by the first review and not been challenged by a new major terrorist attack. 
Therefore, a more open-ended learning and exploration process for future policy development could 
                                                 
8  For instance, the NGO Statewatch (2005) claimed that the use of intelligence and special investigative techniques 
was first and foremost promoted through the G8. Further remarks on research prospects are raised in the conclusion.  
9  Researchers from other national backgrounds may be able to access a larger or different range of experts than were 
contacted for this paper. Futher declassifications are also likely with the simple passage of time, or by contesting the 
decision of the EU Council to withhold information. Experience shows that this appeal procedure may be successful 
in a few instances, but also requires long periods of time. The author is currently engaged in one contestation.   
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be seen as the best way forward. The TWG considered variety of new and technically complex 
issues, such as the fight against radicalisation or surveillance systems (Council 2007c). Precisely for 
this reason, however, member states with greater experience in the fight against terrorism saw the 
advantages of coooperation in a smaller and more informal setting. For instance, the so-called G6 
that reunites the Ministers of Interior of the six largest member states discussed various subjects in 
the fight against terrorism. The new EU Counterterrorism Coordinator reinforced and exploited this 
dynamic through starting a programme on 'pilot projects' by a few lead states that covered different 
aspects of the fight against radicalisation.  
 
Eventually, the Terrorism Working Group settled on 'consequence management' that could be 
defined in relation to terrorism as well as other threats or hazards that were of greater interest to 
other states. Concomitant discussions on the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon may have played an 
additional role in selecting this topic. Once enacted, the Treaty's Solidarity Clause would commit 
member states to mutual assistance in the case of a serious disaster or terrorist attack.  To make this 
EU solidarity and assistance commitment workable and politically sustainable,  each member state 
would have to be handle everything but the largest crisis by itself. This linked to the peer review 
back to the objective of common standards and mutual monitoring. 
 
The concluding summary report that emerged three years later (Council 2010a) contained another 
perceptive summary of the diversity of national institutional structures, but also distilled ten 
recommendation under four thematic headings that covered most core principles of crisis 
management: 1. adequate structures (advance plans and dedicated crisis management centres), 2. 
secure and effective communication systems (within and across member states), 3. improvement of 
cooperation between different sets of actors (crossing civilian and military, cross-boder, or public 
and private divide), 4. communication with the public (for timely incoming and outgoing 
information, plus reassurance functions).  
 
These recommendations could again be seen as a significant achievement, as they formulated a 
common EU understanding that reaches beyond formal legal competences. The more speedy 
conclusion of the review also spoke of the growing acceptance of the peer review process per se, 
including the stable participation of the EU Commission and the Council Secretariat. Nevertheless, 
the appearances of an increasing routine and professionalization of the evaluation  was misleading. 
Due to regular rotation of EU officials as well as national experts, participants could not 
systematically build on previous review experience or on established assessment template. Similar 
to first review, the Council Secretariat and the TWG relied entirely on national self-reporting 
through a questionnaire in order to generate primary information. No reference was made to other 
potential data sources, such as inventory of national civil protection arrangements that had long 
been developed by DG Environment of the European Commission.
10  As the on-site visit program 
was also planned and managed by the hosting country, participating experts could do little more 
than comment on what national administration would already discuss.
11  This lack of an external 
perspective was aggravated by the fact that seconded national evaluators for were mostly 
counterterrorism experts and police representatives, whereas the chosen topic of consequence 
management could have benefitted from a wider range of participants.  
 
                                                 
10       http://ec.europa.eu/echo/civil_protection/civil/vademecum/index.htm 
11  Interview with national expert, March 2011. In the specific review this expert participated, this meant that 
evaluators were drawn into political fights over lead coordination responsibilities of different ministries in times of 
crisis.   
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There is further evidence for lack of deeper analysis. As just argued, the second review reflected an 
ambiguous mix of objectives. On the one hand, the Lisbon Treaty provided for an increased level of 
interdependence that would speak for more mutual monitoring. On the other hand, the formally 
successful conclusion of the first review and the absence of a new major attack gave more space to 
a less political and more open-ended learning process for policy improvement. Thus, the 
recommendations of the second review were not supported by a new tracking and surveillance 
mechanism, such as an improved scoreboard or validating visits by the Council Secretariat. Instead, 
the concluding report was flanked by an annex of 'best practices' in consequence management that 
should stimulate purely voluntary reforms and improvements at the national level.  
 
Yet again, this annex was not developed in sufficient depth or supported by dedicated processes for 
supporting cross-national knowledge transfer and organizational learning. It simply presented a 
wide range of national crisis management structures and processes on the basis of a simple 'copy & 
paste' from various national reports. These examples followed a political logic whereby every 
member state was listed in some form or another. Thematic discussions or criteria on how to assess 
a national institution or process as 'good' or 'best practice' were simply not present. In fact, many 
bullet points contained very little information or remained deeply embedded in particular national 
contexts (complete with national acronyms).  
 
Beyond the peer review report itself, the TWG was not in a position to set up or maintain dedicated 
networks to distil findings and disseminate them via training programs. Even after the ratification of 
the Lisbon Treaty the EU's institutional machinery in the fight against terrorism remained overly 
fragmented (Argomaniz 2009), so that the Council working group that is mainly responsible for 
crisis management (PROCIV) simply failed to take notice of the evaluation process. At the time of 
writing, it was also too early to tell whether the Council of Ministers would pick up on the findings 
in the context of the EU's Action Plan to deal with weapons of mass destruction that would 
constitute the biggest challenge for coping with serious or disastrous terrorist attacks. A recent 
discussion paper by the EU's Counter-terrorism Coordinator reflects the ambiguous state of this 
policy field, noting that available funding is “only being used to a small extent” and that “not all 
member states attend CBRN related meetings” (Council 2011, 12).  
 
Again, future studies could follow up on the medium-term impact of the second peer review, and 
draw on national review documents that remain classified for the time being, but may be released in 
a few years. Greater transparency may also be triggered by a further professionalization of the peer 
review process, as is discussed below in relation to peer reviews in the wider area of EU criminal 
justice cooperation.  
 
  
3.5. Further developments of the peer review instrument 
 
In sum, the two peer reviews in the fight against terrorism suffered from a lack of focus on either 
learning and compliance dynamics with regard to the scope of the review. Moreover, beyond 
identifying new standards or best practices, the reform objectives of the peer reviewsremained 
overly dependent on external political conditions, and suffered from a lack tailored flanking 
measures for administrative capacity building or knowledge management. This interpretation can be 
corroborated by parallel developments as well as future prospects of the peer review process in the 
area of counterterrorism and EU internal security. 
 
In 2008 Slovenia proposed to extend the recommendations of the first peer review to the Western  
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Balkan states (Council 2010b). This clearly followed the experience of the new member states, 
when the prospect (or recent experience) of accession could be leveraged to induce reforms. While 
an inflow of Mujahidin had been a concern during and in the aftermath of the Bosnian war, after 
9/11 the US had already exercised its influence to address the most significant cases. By 2008 the 
Western Balkans could therefore be expected to satisfy the recommendations of the review by 
creating a few formal institutional and legal processes. Nevertheless, Western Balkans merely 
indicated their intentions to take the required steps, whereas the most advanced state on the road to 
accession, Croatia, failed to take part. This weak impact indicates that peer reviews on the fight 
against terrorism are unlikely become an established part of the EU's external security governance 
in its neighbourhood. This especially applies to countries where the fight against terrorism remains 
a sensitive domestic issue, such as Turkey or Algeria. 
 
In contrast, the EU Counterterrorism coordinator recently suggested a new peer review in the area 
of cybersecurity on the grounds that an 'FATF' approach would generate more innovative and 
flexible standards (Council 2010b) that could match the dynamic and global nature of the internet. 
Yet as just argued, if common learning and best practice development in a new issue areas should 
stand of the forefront, a peer review among all twenty-seven member states may not be the best 
place to start. To put it bluntly, what would Germany, for instance, expect to learn from evaluating 
cybersecurity arrangements in Cyprus? Conversely, why would an effective discussion process 
exclude the US that remains the central hub for internet traffic? It seems that EU policy-makers still 
have to formulate a more sophisticated understanding of the divergent objectives of peer reviews in 
contrast to other forms of soft governance or pilot projects among the most capable member states. 
 
Such an understanding seems to have only emerged in other areas of EU Justice and Home Affairs 
cooperation that do not relate directly to the fight against terrorism. While there have been strictly 
'bottom-up' and learning-oriented peer reviews between a subset of EU member states on matters of 
police cooperation (Adang 2008), the trends at the EU levels points to more compliance-related 
evaluation of specific legislative instruments. For instance, the fourth peer evaluation by the Multi-
disciplinary Group on Organized Crime focused on the implementation of the European Arrest 
Warrant, whereas the fifth round surveyed a number of instruments in the fight against money 
laundering and financial crime. This technical focus as also allowed for detailed technical analysis 
beyond general survey data and prolonged expert discussions. These national review reports in 
these areas have also become increasingly accessible in the public section of the EUs online register 
of policy documents. 
 
Peer reviews in the general field of criminal justice cooperation have furthermore been strengthened 
with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the institutional reform of Justice and Home Affairs. 
The MDG was dissolved and split into two different working groups, one dealing with law 
enforcement, another with general affairs and evaluation. It remains to be seen whether a similar 
approach that promotes technically complex and sustained evaluation can be brought to bear on the 
EU's core counterterrorism legislation, such as in aviation security, regulation on explosives (and 











The first peer review on national counterterrorism arrangements in Europe emerged in an ad hoc 
manner on the basis of existing practices of the FATF and the early integration stages of the Area of 
Freedom Security and Justice. Even though the conduct of the review was more challenging than 
originally envisaged, it supported or provided more information on national reform processes in the 
aftermath of the Madrid and London bombings as well as Eastern enlargement. Eventually, the 
evaluation scoreboard led to the formal conclusion that all member states had set up some basic 
arrangements in the fight against terrorism. As cycles of mutual distrust can be an endemic feature 
of international counterterrorism efforts, this symbolic reassurance and mutual reporting on national 
security arrangements should not be underestimated. 
 
Otherwise, the EU peer review had less impact than corresponding efforts by the FATF to achieve 
greater international compliance with a fixed set of recommendations in the fight against terrorism. 
Member states did not face the prospect of public shaming or blacklisting, while national evaluation 
reports remained largely based on self-reported data. A less intrusive approach may be inevitable 
when one moves from relatively technical and abstract regulation – as in the case of financial 
instruments – to more operational structures and processes of security authorities. Thus, one may 
also conclude that the EU's peer review in the fight against terrorism were better than nothing.  
 
The second round of the peer review, which could have improved on the initially improved nature 
of peer reviews or accentuated a more learning-oriented approach, also displayed serious deficits. It 
provided a better thematic focus that was more manageable and appealing to all member states. 
However, the second review did not improve reporting and monitoring processes, or substantiated 
the exchange of best practices by more comprehensive data collection, knowledge management and 
training effort. In fact, from a learning perspective the review accentuated existing deficits, such as 
the designation of review participants on the basis of an equitable participation of all member states 
and EU institutions, which partially stood at odds with the required technical expertise.  And once 
the shock of the Madrid and London bombings had subsided, the Terrorism Working Party  
remained just one component of the EU's fragmented counterterrorism machinery, so that the results 
of the second  review could not be expected to set off wider reforms or policy-discussions.  
 
Generally speaking, this paper has only presented a first explorative analysis of peer reviews in 
European security governance. The EU make extensive use of peer reviews in other issue areas of 
internal security, ranging from operational police cooperation over the prosecution of financial 
crimes to the new policy field of cyber security. To date, none of these peer reviews have attracted 
more than cursory attention by researchers, whereas they could provide for interesting comparative 
analyses and highlight new dynamics of European security governance beyond formal EU 
legislation. For instance, the varied interaction patterns of national professionals and EU officials 
during these peer reviews could serve as a rich case for socialisation studies or for the construction 
of expert authority by international organizations. Once more empirical details about these peer 
reviews have been documented, one should also develop alternative research designs or theoretical 
approaches to explore their effects. As argued above, one could trace and isolate the impact of one 
or two significant recommendations across all member states. This could tie in with the well-
developed literature on the use of conditionality for new member states or externalised security 
governance in the EU's neighbourhood.  
 
From a normative perspective – which would also deserve more academic attention - peer reviews 
in matters of EU internal security require greater publicity and transparency.  Given the changed  
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decision-making arrangements after the Lisbon Treaty, EU policy-makers should take the views of 
the European Parliament or other judicial actors into account. A more open and standardised EU 
review process could take on an even greater importance, as member states have hitherto failed to 
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